

Tomas Kačerauskas

## Metaphor and Culture

### Introduction

Metaphor is important because it helps to develop philosophical poetics. I will investigate metaphor as a model or *paradeigma*, according to Aristotle. If metaphor as a part of poetical creation has analogous structure with philosophical poetics, it extends the concept of philosophical poetics. Metaphor is a narrow aspect of culture. However, there intersect daily and poetic language, cognitive and emotional meanings. Does metaphor convey messages? Does it indicate something? Is it merely a decoration of language? These questions may be expanded by applying them to culture in general. If culture is knowledge, does then a broad knowledge indicate a higher level of culture? What is the purpose of culture? Is culture merely a decoration of life? Therefore, in making an assumption that metaphor is a model of culture I will examine Ricoeur's theory of metaphor on one side (*Ricoeur's theory of metaphor*), and Baudrillard's and Šliogeris' attitude towards contemporary culture on the other side (*Criticism of culture*). The combination of these, seemingly, different language-games (Ricoeur's hermeneutics of metaphor, Baudrillard's simulacrum theory, Šliogeris' culture's criticism) will allow: 1) to verify whether the mentioned assumption is well-founded, 2) to specify and supplement with new aspects the philosophical poetics. Thus, encouraged by Wittgenstein and Ricoeur I will analyze metaphor as a model of culture and later as a paradigm of philosophical poetics. Language-games of the first one may be called as culture-games because culture would vanish if deprived of language (verbal and written transfer) aspect. Therefore, metaphor could be also called as a culture-game. The second one not only successfully combined philosophical traditions of semantics, analytics and hermeneutics by his theory of metaphor but also he presented metaphor as a model of literature. As being a model of literature, it is likely that it can be a model of both philosophical poetics and

even of the whole culture. However, that kind of expansion cannot evade negative manifestations of culture, which are inseparable from a viewing of cultural subject. Consequently, ethical and ontological aspects of metaphor appear, which I am going to analyze last (*Poetic identity*).

### Ricoeur's theory of metaphor

Ricoeur perceives metaphor as a dual tension: 1) between its two members, 2) between its two interpretations. Metaphor blossoms suddenly a new meaning which is slowly diffused. When we treat it as a comparison it loses this effect of semantic shock. Thus, metaphor's treatment as a hidden comparison (Aristotle's interpretation) is not fruitful because metaphor is a categorical mistake, a strategy of absurdity which consciously violates language code. When it becomes an ordinary language cliché, it dies. Meanwhile, living metaphor provokes, at the same time destroying its own literal meaning and opens a horizon of new meanings. According to Ricoeur, metaphor brings out new semantic whole from the ruins of literal meaning. If it destroys literal plane then how it is perceived? Is this trope analyzed as a word, a sentence or as a discourse? What reality does it point out? If only a poetic, what is its relation with the world or what is metaphor's ontology? What does a poetic reality indicate: is it personal experiences of a poet, an enclosed space of feelings? If yes, how are they accessible and why they have to be interesting for a reader? The latter two questions are not examined by Ricoeur. I will try to analyze them later (*Poetic identity*) in the context of philosophical poetics (not aesthetics). When studying this trope of poetry, I will try to expand the ideas of philosophical poetics. During the investigating of this trope I will try to develop the ideas of philosophical poetics, as well. What concerns me at this point is whether metaphor could be a model of culture. If it can, if it is that cumulative that while being a small part of poetic language it encompasses the most important aspects of culture, it will come in hand when developing philosophical poetics. However, first of all, it is needed to test whether the assumption of metaphor, as a model of culture, is well-founded. While invoking Baudrillard and Šliogeris, I will show negative aspects of culture and I will apply them as a test for the verification of the mentioned assumption.

Let's get back to Ricoeur. The French philosopher notices that metaphor is discursive *par excellence*. However, elsewhere he notices that it is the opaque side of discourse, supporting it<sup>1</sup>. The opaque means that metaphor consciously avoids direct description which it removes to other plane through destruction.

<sup>1</sup> "La figure est ce qui fait paraître le discours en le redant opaque" (P. Ricoeur, *La métaphore vive*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1975, p. 145).

What kind of is this other plane? How it is connected with metaphor's, as a model, aspirations? Metaphor's detour brings it closer to a long way of hermeneutics in three ways: 1) it itself demands understanding, 2) it, as well as hermeneutics, seeks not explaining but pointing out a creative horizon open to interpretations, 3) both the theory of metaphor and hermeneutics intersect with poetics: metaphor is the principal trope of poetry, whereas, Gadamer's hermeneutics is directed to works of art<sup>2</sup>. However, metaphor though indicating a new meaning does not lose the old one. Thus, not only does it remove but also concentrates. This dual receptivity of metaphor<sup>3</sup> allows to intersect in it sign (primary) and sentence (secondary) meanings. However, it does not confine itself to sentence's context; in it language and discourse intertwine. Ricoeur perceives discourse as an event of language. It also maintains meaningful plane. This way metaphor contains a fusion of word and sentence, event and meaning. In this intersection, when metaphor looks backwards and forwards (word and sentence), up and down (event and meaning), appears a new value of metaphor, not only semantic (of language) but also its valuable (of a world) novelty. This way metaphor not only concentrates different planes of language but also oversteps language itself while opening existential dimension. How does it make it? Is metaphor, being a trope of language, able to open a world?

First of all, I will focus on metaphor's sensual aspects. Ricoeur notices that the sense and sensations are interrelated in poetic language. This kind of language tends to be closed, directed to its own imaginary reality. Whether a closed poetry, embracing only poet's experiences, expresses poetic identity, I will discuss later (Poetic identity). At this moment it is important to find out how metaphor's sensual aspect comes to display and how it associates with being in the world, i.e. extralinguistic reality. The dual of metaphor, according to Ricoeur, displays itself in the way that it extends the power of dual meaning from cognitive to affective dimension. The French philosopher associates effectiveness with connotation – associative psychological function, while contrasting it with denotation – informative logical function. Another expression to refer to connotation is a marking of a thing in a sensual detour. Consequently, besides semantic detour, which is directed against direct description, sensual detour appears, which is directed against cognitive logical function. Here instead of *seeing what*, *seeing as* (Davidson) or being in front of eyes (Aristotle) emerges. This allows Ricoeur establishing

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<sup>2</sup> Both while analyzing it and looking for the principles of interpretation of works of art (H.-G. Gadamer, *Kunst als Aussage* (Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 8), Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen 1993, H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1960).

<sup>3</sup> Ricoeur compares it with Heidegger's dual of being in the world (*Zwiefalt*) (P. Ricoeur, "The metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling" in *On Metaphor*, ed. Sheldon Sacks, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1978, pp. 151-152).

a new discipline – psycholinguistics, which would encompass both metaphor’s semantics and its psychology.

*Seeing as* encompasses not only sensual but also visual metaphor’s aspect, which is not verbal as well. *Seeing as*, which gets intensified when reading, connects verbal meaning with the power of imagination. It is a spark of imagination in the plane of idea<sup>4</sup>. Here Ricoeur is close to Davidson who claims that „metaphor is the dreamwork of language” and its „interpretation is itself a work of the imagination”<sup>5</sup>. The contradiction in metaphor, its literal meaning’s self-destruction and the strategy of absurdity operate as a strike stimulating imagination. This is also related with Gadamer’s tragic recognition, which being awakened by unexpected drama’s course of events and instantly unlighted, becomes a way of coexistence, and in this way enriching the conception of hermeneutical horizon and philosophical poetics, as well. Similarly, to Davidson the novelty of metaphor means aesthetic experience and infinite interpretational openness, which is possible just because of active primary meaning of metaphor. Davidson also denies metaphor’s cognitive meaning: it does not embody any ideas and does not help in the recognition of truth and fact. Hermeneutics is not concerned whether truth or fact, as well. Gadamer, invoking a work of art, looks for the understanding’s condition such as showing and recognition. These conditions render directedness (of creator) and openness (of the participant of understanding). They are in a language which opens horizon where meet both text and the participant of understanding, creator and the one who perceives creator’s work.

Metaphor as a linguistic means of expression<sup>6</sup> encompasses both showing and recognition. Moreover, its showing is radical; it is an explosive charge seeking hearer’s shock. Booth gives an example how metaphor determines a judgment in court. However, metaphor has to be alive, according to Ricoeur. The explosive device won’t function if metaphor is dead: either too ordinary and has become a language’s cliché, or lost its addressee because of changes in language and world outlook (some antique lines). Living metaphor helps to identify, resolve judicial disputes or to evoke ideas, i.e. to bring together two poles of understanding: two interlocutors, text and a reader, poet and nation. Thus, metaphor functions as understanding’s horizon. In other words, it can be

<sup>4</sup> “*La métaphore est vive en ce qu’elle inscrit l’élan de l’imagination dans un ‘penser plus’ au niveau du concept*” (P. Ricoeur, *La métaphore vive*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1975, p. 384).

<sup>5</sup> D. Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean”, in *On Metaphor*, ed. Sheldon Sacks, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1978, p. 29.

<sup>6</sup> I will analyze metaphor’s negative aspects of expressiveness in the context of Baudrillard’s (J. Baudrillard, *L’échange symbolique et la mort*, Gallimard, Paris 1976) and Šliogeris’ (A. Šliogeris, *Transcendencijos tyla*, Pradai, Vilnius 1996) criticism of culture.

regarded as a paradigm of hermeneutics. This is why hermeneutics of Ricoeur<sup>7</sup> opens a field for the research in metaphor. It is another cumulative plane of metaphor: it does not only encompass word and sentence, language and discourse but also functions as discipline's model (in this case – hermeneutics), which can help to expand discipline's features.

Let's return to metaphor. According to Ricoeur, it encompasses a one more plane, that of imagination. Metaphor is a fusion of meaning and image. This way iconicity of sense appears. What is iconicity of sense, isn't it a contradiction in itself? How intellect is associated with imagination? How is it connected with *seeing as* which is the metaphor's principle? Does iconicity mean the extinction of linguistic aspect? If understanding is linguistic, doesn't this condition negate metaphor's, as a model of hermeneutics, assumption? *Seeing as* is related to imagination, whereas, iconicity widens the meaning governed by imagination. Here it is also said that images are related to poetic pronunciation (*diction poétique*). In what way are *seeing as*, iconicity, imagination and poetic language interrelated? It seems that *seeing as* belongs to the plane of hermeneutics, iconicity – to aesthetics, imagination – to psychology, and poetic language – to poetics or rhetoric. Is it possible to combine these different discourses? What is the role of philosophy in it? To claim that philosophy combines them means to concede special powers to philosophy, which would raise it above other disciplines. It also means that a philosopher is a figure of exceptional abilities, the instance of knowledge, to which is as if logical to give a mandate of power. This platonic approach is close to a romantic conception of genius and to contemporary illusion of knowing<sup>8</sup>. This approach, regarding it as metaphysics, is criticized by later Wittgenstein, Popper and Rorty. This view is not followed by Ricoeur as well. However, not only this relates the French philosopher with the mentioned critics of metaphysics. The later Wittgenstein before Ricoeur speaks about visual seeing. For him picture is inseparable from meanings of words and cognition in general. Picture, as cognition's conditions determined by historical environment and individual beliefs, is given together with language. Picture is a fusion of the language-games and world outlook, the unity of „thought and reality”, which I called shifting stability<sup>9</sup>. Picture is stable because it is provided together with our language, environment and implanted attitudes. This way it encompasses the tragic aspect of human existence: we are doomed to play like that, to use these words and to perform these acts. Picture changes because diverse language-games crosses in it while stimulating to change the image itself. Similarly,

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<sup>7</sup> Here I have in mind his merits for hermeneutics. Ricoeur was not less influenced by semiotics and psychoanalysis. In my opinion, no one has such a capability to combine diverse discourse as Ricoeur.

<sup>8</sup> I will speak about the latter a bit later (*Criticism of culture*).

<sup>9</sup> T. Kačerauskas, “Wittgensteinas – analitikas ar hermeneutikas?” in *Problemos* No. 56 1999.

for Ricoeur iconicity is of linguistic character. It is a verbal dimension of imagination. However, imagination encompasses thought not through any word but through metaphor. Thus, metaphor becomes visible scheme for imagination, while literal meaning emerges in a consonance of sameness and difference. This way metaphor encompasses imagination and thought (scheme). Ricoeur speaks about thinking in poetry, which is both verbal and visual. Similarly, for Gadamer understanding embraces both recognition and showing. Hence iconicity, as directedness to other similar situation, widens verbal understanding while providing it with visual and sensual aspects. Iconicity also means momentary understanding which appears as recognition of aspect. However, it is possible just because of metaphor which encompasses word and image, sense and intellect, linguistics and psychology. This conditions an emergence of a new science – psycholinguistics, the assumption of which is the analysis of metaphor's meaningful and sensual dimensions.

Thus, metaphor's theory – a detour of hermeneutics – allows Ricoeur to extend understanding in terms of iconic aspect. The theory of metaphor also brings us to philosophical poetics, which here expresses itself not only as an interpretational discipline. It encompasses the tragedy of human existence which in the case of Wittgenstein expresses itself as a doom for the language-games, in the case of Gadamer – as a striking effect on the participant of understanding, and in the case of Heidegger – as nearness of being to death. It encompasses also partnership which is embodied by hermeneutic horizon for Gadamer, whereas, for Ricoeur – by metaphor-icon as directing openness to the world and to participant of discourse. As such, philosophical poetics is directed both against celebration of knowledge (metaphor's openness – against the closure of formula), and against the concept of genius (both participants in metaphor – the one who renders and recognizes it and the one who interprets – are of equal value). Hence philosophical poetics is not a narrow discipline of rhetoric (persuading) or poetics (influence on viewer or reader) as it was perceived by Aristotle. However, it is not an overall and omnipotent metaphysics, coercion of knowledge, though it could possess good intentions, as it was suggested by Plato. Philosophical poetics is democratic *par excellence*. How does it manifest?

Let's get back to the theory of metaphor. Ricoeur notices that metaphor, as reading in general as well, is „a suspension of all reality”<sup>10</sup>. This suspension or *epoché*, according to Husserl, is peculiar to reading in general; in other words, both presence and absence. Metaphor balances between word and thing<sup>11</sup>. In what sense metaphor is present and in what not? What is the relation of this

<sup>10</sup> P. Ricoeur, *La métaphore vive*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1975, p. 266.

<sup>11</sup> When speaking about the meaning of metaphor, Ricoeur says: „le sens reste le médiateur entre les mots et les choses, c'est à-dire ce par quoi les mots se rapportent aux choses“ (Ricoeur 1975: 159).

quasi-reality to the world and human existence? Does philosophical poetics and ontology intersect one another? If yes, then at what point?

Metaphor's quasi-reality indicates that in the case of metaphor word lose its, as reference, function. Though Cohen<sup>12</sup> admits that metaphor is informative, Davidson categorically negates its cognitive content. According to him, metaphor is not a hiding of one thing behind another. This way it would remain dependent on referential function even though it would be only a turned reference. Saying that metaphor is informative Cohen means not the metaphor itself but its surroundings: speaker's confidence and his/her belief in listener's confidence. In this sense metaphor remains *seeing as* without being a reference to anything. So, Davidson, Cohen and Ricoeur agree that metaphor is not a reference. If it does not indicate anything, what is its purpose then? As it is known, it is a poetic device, i.e. verbal (not necessarily of poetry only). Maybe metaphor refers to itself? Then, does a word – virtual reality – when enclosing into itself spawn despite of thing or simply of reality? It this what Ricoeur had in mind claiming that metaphor „denotes the distance between the letter (*la letter*) and virtual meaning”<sup>13</sup>. At the same time he claims that it „connotes a whole cultural orientation (*regime*), that of a person who highlights in contemporary literature its self-signifying function”<sup>14</sup>. Denotation in Ricoeur's theory of metaphor is its interpretable, informative and logic part and referential function as well. It is relationship between sign and thing. Connotation is not interpretable part of metaphor, which covers its sense aspect. Thus, metaphor, according to Ricoeur, is connotation without denotation. The reference in it is bracked. At the same time, Ricoeur claims that such position marks our cultural situation. What is that cultural situation like? With the help of Baudrillard and Šliogeris I will further on analyze modern culture. Then I will return to the question about metaphor' relation with the world and the human existence. Finally, I will analyze whether the presumption that metaphor is a model of culture has been confirmed, and how it changed (even if it has not been confirmed) or added philosophical poetics.

### Criticism of culture

I will analyze the Baudrillard's attitudes to culture as a test for metaphor and philosophical poetics as model of culture. Baudrillard, whose sources of philosophy partially coincide with Ricoeur's<sup>15</sup> sources, notices that

<sup>12</sup> T. Cohen, "Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy" in *On Metaphor*, ed. Sheldon Sacks, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1978.

<sup>13</sup> P. Ricoeur, *La métaphore vive*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1975, p. 189.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 189.

<sup>15</sup> I mean here French structuralism.

culture<sup>16</sup>, which has become the interchange between signs, lost its reference (simulacrum). Similarly, Šliogeris claims that there is too much of culture. What negative manifestations do these thinkers notice? What has determined such cultural situation? Is it improvable? If so, with what hopes is this associated? What is metaphor's, as the model's of culture, role here?

Baudrillard does not provide theory of metaphor. He interprets poetry, but this interpretation does not digress from his point of view towards culture as different spheres of man's activity. They are unified by the „symbolic exchange and death”. What is the symbolic exchange and how is it associated with metaphor quasi-reality? What is the role of death here?

Baudrillard analyzes very different manifestations of modern culture: labour relations, covering manufacture's automation, cosmic programs, strikes, unemployment; finances and their aspects such as investment, inflation; technology and science; society and its norms and institutions; ecological and stock crisis; terrorism and taking of hostages; manifestations of city's culture, such as fashion, graffiti, the cult of body; sexuality and funeral ceremonies, and finally, suicide and euthanasia.

Sign concentrates society. Norms of a society show in: 1) one logic applying to everyone, 2) expulsion of antibodies. For the latter ones there are special institutions: jails, sanctuaries, hospitals, schools, and factories. This way, though society's norms shows racism of culture. Not only animals, criminals, madmen, and dead, but children as well appear behind our realizable humanness. We made unborn children, just like animals, „racially inferior, not worth even our justice, suitable only for disembowel”. Suicide, euthanasia, and natural death are not accepted by institutional society. Death must be guarded by doctors, agony must be prolonged by any price and any possible technical devices, and even after death struck the dissection has to legalize it by a sign. Only then the decedent can die. This way, by creating norms and civilizing, the society applies racial criteria. Here quasi-reality (norm, the object of science) is aggressive and repressive from the perspective of reality (person, thing). Still, not only because of this culture has a aspect of death. The dead are cremated, so there is less and less place for the in cemetery. The same way the number of madhouses is decreasing – madmen „are being integrated into a society”. Victims of abortions are not paid any attention at all: their mothers and fathers „are cured” by psychologists, in order to eliminate their smallest corner in parents' brains. Baudrillard draws a conclusion: if madmen are not in madhouses they are everywhere, if dead people are not given separate place they are

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<sup>16</sup> This involves different spheres of man's life – science, finances, funeral ceremony, such most popular manifestation of culture as graffiti and fashion. Thus, it is possible to claim that it is spoken about culture in most general sense.

among us. So, our culture, directed not towards person or thing (reality), but towards itself (hyper reality), is the culture of death. It is closed culture because only such culture can warrant absolute liquidity of signs (changeability). At the same time, it is aggressive and racial culture, usurping for its exchange everything that is behind it, including human health and life. Those, who does not surrender to this hoministic (Šliogeris) recast (suicides, unborn children), are exiled behind the boundaries of culture and humanity.

At the beginning of the work, following Ricoeur, I made a presumption that metaphor is a model of culture. If it is so, does metaphor and philosophical poetics express the culture of death? Baudrillard himself does not answer to this question. We can only try to reconstruct this by using his theory of poetry.

According to Baudrillard, good poetry is a „festival of exchanges”, which has a limited collection of words. Their continuous circulation during the process of exchange and giving presents gives „inexhaustible riches”. Meaning here is pointed towards itself. It duplicates and destroys itself. The independence of a poetic word, which has lost its reference, allows us to change it freely. As Baudrillard says, if verses refer to something, it is every time anything, the element of non-existence, „zero meaning”. The contentment of poetry is associated with its endless deciphering. Good poetry is „hectic dispersal”, lost, the death of meaning. Contrary, bad poetry always leaves language remainders, which remain not exchanged, thus they press with the „material of unclear discourse”. It seems that Baudrillard’s theory of poetry fits to apocalyptic conception of culture. With a help of metaphor poetic language embodies gap between reality and thought. Instead of direct reference to thing it refers to its closed world, where distant meanings exchange freely and duplicate providing aesthetic pleasure. If metaphor is only a speculation on unreal meanings, refers only to closed (racial) cultural cycle, and expresses death culture, then how to combine this with Gadamer’s recognition? About what ethical and ontological aspects of metaphor can we speak, if it refers only to nothing, emptiness of existence? Is it the way we should understand Davidson’s claim, that metaphor has no cognitive content?

Before returning to these questions, I will analyze Šliogeris’ conception, which includes diagnosis of culture’s crisis and aims to restore its positive content as well. Šliogeris associates negative tendencies of culture with panhomistic illusions. What is this? Talking about culture Šliogeris notices that this is „the whole of symbols important for a man”<sup>17</sup>. Panhomistic illusion is associated with temptation to consider everything as culture, to identify it with being. This cultural viewing or „reculturing” by humanizing everything is concurrent from man’s deification. Today this means „naive belief in omnipotence of

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<sup>17</sup> A. Šliogeris, *Transcendencijos tyla*, Pradai, Vilnius 1996, p. 55.

science and technologies<sup>18</sup>. Still, science is suspicious and aggressive from the point of view of nature, and „experiment is a torment of nature<sup>19</sup>. Entertaining and culturing in similar ways we destroy „being a thing”. When an image separates from the world and „homonistic surrogate” of pure relation dislodges it the world becomes „the material of technological and ideological remake<sup>20</sup>. Such culturing or world’s humanization is followed by ego-logia and ego terror, which is pointed not only against nature and God but against person as well, when individual „is resolved into pure relations”, and „the concept and image of individual in general loses ontological sense<sup>21</sup>. Culturing here is associated with racism and aggression (genocide of foreign, non-human nature), as well. The pure relations here equal Baudrillard’s signs without reference. Just like in the of Baudrillard’s case, pure relations become aggressive from the point of view of individual and the world: they do not accept any autonomy of individual, and threatens to destroy the world physically by nuclear bomb, which itself is a lump of pure relations. Thus, in Šliogeris case as well it is possible to call culture and its surplus the culture of death. Here culturing and humanization mean destroying as well. This threatening situation arises when man’s glance is pointed toward him/herself, when his/her world is closed in the cell of reflective pure relations, and when ego-logic blankets ethics, and culture and culturing – ontology. According to Šliogeris, this happens when „symmetry of phenomenon and transcendence” is trampled upon.

This way, the presumption of metaphor, as the model of culture, brings to the question of subject. Culture is inseparable from its subject’s attitude towards the world and itself in it. Baudrillard and Šliogeris showed that this attitude could rebound upon the subject itself and other person. Thus, this way the subject constitutes and protects itself, and metaphor, analyzed as the model of culture, uncloses in ontological and ethic plan. Neglect of this plan would make the theory of metaphor shallow, and the theory of culture would allow treating culture as catastrophically, as Baudrillard and Šliogeris saw it. As a result, the further development of metaphor, as the model of culture, is inseparable from the question of (subject’s) identity. Founding on Eliot and Levinas, further on I will analyze poetic identity, because 1) I hear analyze metaphor – the most important component of the poetic language, 2) Baudrillard understands metaphor as a radical gap, which allows „ideally” (without remains) exchange unreal values. This perfectly illustrates his attitude towards culture as exchange from the point of view of aggressive reality. Finally, 3) I hope that poetic identity

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 58.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 135.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 356.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 423.

will add to the framework of philosophical poetics. In this sense, my analysis will remain a detour: I will develop philosophical poetics indirectly, presenting its features, still in the long way – analyzing metaphor and poetic identity<sup>22</sup>.

Before switching to the question of poetic identity, I will return for a while to Šliogeris' positive programme, which will be of great importance later on. We saw that Šliogeris, just like Baudrillard, criticizes culture (its surplus) for its abruption from „experience of things”. This way appears the element of pure relation, which by scientific abuse and entertaining usage redounds upon man, when violating fragile balance between existence and nothingness and symmetry between phenomenon and transcendence's. This balance collapses because of „panhormistic illusion” which is presupposed by pure (according to Baudrillard, non-referential) relation and cultural surplus. However, differently from Baudrillard, who defines such situation as irrecoverable, Šliogeris raises Husserl's idea of „return to things themselves”. What does it mean to return to things? How is this associated with ethic and ontological plan of metaphor? Isn't this ignorance of the poetic language, if we understand it as Baudrillard? I will return to these questions after analyzing poetic identity.

### Poetic identity

English poet Eliot, when talking about poet's identity in his verses, in his work *The use of poetry and the use of criticism* claims that poet's experience is unrecognizable for the poet himself. According to Eliot, experience can emerge by merging of many and very different in their nature feelings, that even having sold them the poet can hardly recognize what he has announced. What has been announced just did not exist until the poem was written. Elsewhere Eliot says that a poem sees the light after a long incubatory period. Before the shelling splinters we do not know what is in the egg. Inspiration, the splintering of a shelling, is not finding of word to express one's feelings or identity. It is rather negation – breaking of common barriers, which appear over and over. It is a motion, sally, which breaks down when words which locate in a certain way on paper. Poet hardly accepts this motion as his own, because it 1) does not require any endeavour; 2) it is pointed against poet's inner barriers, i.e. his identity. If a poet neglects himself by poetry, what is poetic identity then? How is it associated with ethic and ontological aspect of metaphor?

Eliot associates poet's breakthrough, which from the first sight seems to be pointed upon poetic identity, with the purpose of poetry. I will return to it later.

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<sup>22</sup> Here I accept Ricœur's and Gadamer's authority: the first develops hermeneutics with a help of psychoanalysis, the second – with a help of aesthetics and poetics (T. Kačerauskas, *Filosofinė poetika, Versus aureus, Vilnius 2006*).

What is important here is that poetry cannot be determined by its functions, according to Eliot. Eliot notices that the functions of poetry changed, and during every epoch requirements for it were different, even though they were partially formulated by a new attitude of the poet himself. In other words, society forms the demand on poetry, and society is formed by „new” poets. In conclusion, the interaction of reading society and poetry is open and affecting both sides (the creating and the reading ones). In this point Eliot’s view is similar to Gadamer’s, in whose hermeneutic horizon meet tradition and creative direction. This interaction is restricted by the theory of genius, which accepts one direction exchange and closed world of a genius. This is incompatible neither with Eliot’s ideal of clear and simple poetry, nor with Gadamer’s main principle of understanding (hermeneutic horizon). The treatment of poetry as a genuine creation is inseparable from mystic nature. Although Eliot accepts that poetry arises feelings and thus can be associated with mysticism and mystic experiences, he indicated two dangers here: outside (for a critic) and inside (for the poet himself). A critic impoverishes poetry by adopting a religious text, as any scheme, for it. Due to the same reason, Ricoeur criticizes the linguistic test of metaphor, and Davidson – the communicative one<sup>23</sup>. Metaphor and poetic language in general refers not to closed (individual) world of signs but not to real relations either. In the first case the theory of metaphor leads to aggressive surplus of culture while the second one leads to the functional understanding of metaphor, when it is expected to function as comparison only. Poet’s admiration in ecstatic verses is harmful in two ways: it encloses poet into his mystical world of genius and takes away the simplicity, clarity and openness from his poetry. Then, what is the place of poetry: ideal or real? Eliot formulates this question differently: what is the use of poetry?

Eliot himself admits that these questions overstep poets’ competence because they lead far behind the sphere of poetry, while poets behave instinctively. Thus I will try to answer these questions with the help of the theory of metaphor. We have seen that the different planes of metaphor overstep the boundaries of one trope. As a model the metaphor covers all culture. Culture – human creative activity – can be harmful, thus the question about the place of poetry, developed together with the theory of metaphor, is a question about man’s place in the world as well. Relation between metaphor and being or ontological aspect of metaphor is only a presumption: I present it as a further direction of the analysis. However, this presumption leads to Gadamer’s notional horizon of a poetic work, which has ontological aspect (poetic mediation as an

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<sup>23</sup> As we have already seen, Eliot is against the function of metaphor’s rendering: verses are not the expression of poet’s feelings. Here Eliot joins Davidson and Ricoeur, who neglect metaphor’s being informative.

authentic being showing itself). Piece of poetry is important for Gadamer as a model of understanding, thus analyzing the questions further on in addition to Ricoeur's theory of metaphor I will rely on Gadamer's hermeneutics. On the other hand the ontological aspect leads to Heidegger's *Dasein*.

We have seen that Eliot, Davidson and Ricoeur agree that poetic language „releases from intentional references, which are characteristic of daily and scientific language” (Ricoeur). The world of poetry is autonomic, independent from both empirical relations and logic of thinking. That's why metaphor rises as „categorical mistake” (Ricoeur) or „language dream” (Davidson). Poetry and metaphor, as its model creates their own world by suggesting poetic (unreal) discourse. How can this discourse be conciliated with Šliogeris' and Husserl's idea of „coming back to things” and the ontological aspect of metaphor? Does it lead to the Baudrillard' aggressive hyper-reality, which is directed at the human world?

On the contrary, Ricoeur claims that writing opens the world and poetic texts talk about the world. How can metaphor talk about the world if its reference is suspended or even abolished? Whose and what kind of feelings does the poet in Eliot's text express when he breaks the barriers of daily relations in his own world? According to Ricoeur, poetic language tells about reality, but it is done in a special way by suspending or abolishing the direct reference. But it is not a secondary reference to which Baudrillard refers, that after reproduction becomes the third reference, which is far from reality and human life. Only after abolishing the ordinary reference or breaking the barriers, as Eliot put it, the indirect or the second reference appears. This reference is just the second of the ordinary one according to descriptive language. Differently than it is in Baudrillard simulacrum theory, it does not constitute aggressive cultural relations, which involves the individual in its closed sphere of symbolic change. Ricoeur says that it opens „the deep structure of reality to which we are related as mortals who are born into this world and who  *dwell* in it for a while”<sup>24</sup>. So metaphor destroys in two ways: 1) by bracketing the ordinary (daily or instrumental, i.e. scientific) reference to the world and 2) by breaking the inner barriers of poet (those that cannot be isolated from his identity). But that is why it helps to approach the existential dimension of reality and constitutes poetic identity. With this constitution arises the tragic aspect of human existence: we are born in this world and we stay here for a time that we are given. So metaphor (having its inner logic, which is acknowledged by its users), can be called Wittgenstein's language-game, and approaches it with existential dimension: that is how language-games are played in this way

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<sup>24</sup> P. Ricoeur, “The metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling” in *On Metaphor*, ed. Sheldon Sacks, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1978, p. 151.

and not in any other; and we are born in such environment, where we are taught to understand it like this. Similarly, Gadamer's hermeneutics is based on an accidental event, which appears only for a short time. That is the model according to which piece of art becomes a game in Gadamer's understanding. But even if the existential dimension of metaphor is acknowledged, it is not clear what connects it to reality. If a metaphor is not always understood, then does the recognition of reality in metaphor suppose a poet's genial and the readers' congenial ability?

Ricoeur speaks about the mood that gives a poem expression and structure. At the same time mood becomes a specific form of being in the world, relation with it, understanding and interpretation of it. He also talks about the poetic feeling which is a part of poetic work, which helps to understand it and which is not opposite to the idea. This is possible because poetic feeling is intentional that is that links the inner experience with the outer understanding. Breaking the closed poetic identity, it becomes open to the mood that is experienced by the reader. Poetic feeling is seeing as, which reveals the human being in it. Similarly, Wittgenstein's picture is given together with the language involving human world view. Poetic feeling as a picture, or view, defines not the existential (as well as tragic) human being's view in the world. Because it, just as alive metaphor, is always new even if it is influenced by tradition (usage of language), poetic feeling opens the world at the same time constituting poetic identity. But how does the poet open his seeing as? How does the poetic feeling of the poet and the reader meet? This could be asked a bit differently – how a piece of poetry is understood. All these questions lead us to Gadamer's hermeneutics where the understanding is analyzed as the understanding of the poetic piece.

A piece of art is thought to be a game that comprises of mimesis and recognition for Gadamer. During the game, one not only pays attention to all the closed art game rules but also gets involved in it; that is why it seems that this game takes place on the account of the participant of game consciousness or poetic identity. On the other hand, this seeing of art is not forced as it happens in scientific discourse or ordinary reference case. When an actor or poet mimes, an observer or reader recognizes momentarily as if that has happened some time before; that is how poetic feeling, uniting the actor and observer, the poet and reader, tradition and creative direction. Recognition is only possible as merger of hermeneutic horizons. The hermeneutic horizon supposes an alive lingual coexistence, when „language has in mind not itself, but another person (*den Anderen*) and another thing (*das Andere*)”<sup>25</sup>. In the same way, metaphor expresses „intimate communication” (Cohen), involving both sides

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<sup>25</sup> H.-G. Gadamer, *Kunst als Aussage* (Gesammelte Werke, Bd.8), Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1993, p. 432.

into a closed game, which allows the poetic feeling of the poet and reader meet, having recognized *seeing as*. So the poetic identity is constituted in a tragic way – not only because it takes place only momentarily (when it is recognized) but also because when the closed world of poet is broken the subject is denied. On the other hand, this constitution is very generous, because it gives the way for creative horizon. That means that the tragic recognition of metaphor during the game does not let it treat as a multiplication of hyper-reality. Baudrillard does not claim it. He just criticizes the non-referential character of our culture. Even though, recognition, which is supposed through poetic feeling, is of double reference, i.e. 1) to our being in the world and 2) to our meeting with the Other. In this way not only ontological but also ethical aspect of metaphor is revealed. This allows talking about the openness of metaphor as its relation with life and about extralinguistic dimension. Metaphor that comprises of creation (the novelty) and discovery (recognition) shows not only reality, poetic identification, but also „return to the things” (Šliogeris) and to oneself. Having in mind that it is possible only paying attention to the condition of ethical openness to the Other, my analysis of the ethical aspect of metaphor is based on Levinas’ ethics.

Levinas contemplates the ethical relation of I and the Other by using metaphors ‚house’, ‚trace’ and ‚face’. Poet Eliot analyzes the questions of the poetic function and poetic identity, having admitted the limited powers of poetry in expressing this. At that point, the thinker Levinas is concerned about the individual’s relation with Other as person or thing; and at the same time about this place in the world, freedom and powers of creativity, directed to infinity. However, he analyzes it poetically – his thinking is metaphorical. If we will be successful in showing that Levinas’ metaphors express the philosophical content of identity, we will approach to the main goal of this part – to the question of metaphor as a model. We started from metaphor as a model of philosophical poetics and culture in general, and encountered its ontological (reference to the world and a human being in it) aspect, which led to the poetic identity that cannot be separated from the ethical relation with the Other. If poetic identity is not fed with this relation, the ontological aspect of metaphor simply loses its basis. Then the voice of poet floats in unreal and genial height and his metaphor is just a decoration, which becomes aggressive in sense of human reality and poetic identity. So the ethical content of metaphor is another side of its ontological aspect, without it the hypothesis of metaphor as a culture model may be destroyed.

What do Levinas’ metaphors ‚face’, ‚trace’ and ‚house’ mean? According to Levinas, ‚face’ is thought to be something how the Other reveals itself while overstepping the idea of the Other in me. He speaks also about idea of infinity when we accept Other beyond the limit of I. Then the philosopher claims that the face speaks and the revelation of face is actually language. This language is

not to be separated from the world view. The face presents the whole world. He directs beyond it and through a human face divinity is revealed. At the same time, it is the meeting place, when thinking meets with that, which goes beyond its abilities, with that which he every moment absorbed without any hostility towards him. Things do not have any face not because they are not met, but the reason is that things are changed and realized. In this sense Baudrillard's cultural relations are material, because they embody changes, whereas Šliogeris for over-cultural unreal relations contrasts things that open the world. Šliogeris speaks about their closeness.

The closeness of the world Levinas expresses with the help of ‚house‘ metaphor. ‚House‘ concentrates on ‚I‘ and opens the Other because of the human being's intimacy in it. That's how there secretly the world arrives. Hereby, the environment of the house lets for my ‚I‘ to take things out of element by work and to open the world. So things do not only distance from the world, but they also open it, if they are taken from elements that are equivalent to Šliogeris space of pure relation or the environment of symbolic changes of Baudrillard.

‚Trace‘ expresses indirect relation that unites face and the third person, which itself covers the other person as well, and the being of God. The trace is disturbing the order. Besides, trace expresses in its real sense „that something has never been here, something that has always passed“. Trace is a more common metaphor (not a concept) than face or house is. The mildness of a woman face is raised as the lust for infinity. Face is always someone else's, we never see our face, that is why it directs and moves beyond narrow ‚I‘ limits. Thus, moving it concentrates: ‚I‘ meets with the other in femininity, when an embrace gets the intentionality of search. House, oppositely, expresses inness, accumulation, one's directedness to himself and separation from the world. On the other hand, femininity gives intimacy to the house. According to Levinas, the separation needs to be lighted by face. That's why the world is born in the house, but this happens secretly, when femininity maintains the directedness towards the Other. Face and house accumulate by directedness. Overstepping oneself, i.e. losing one's identity, ‚I‘ regains it during the meeting with Other in his intentional aspirations. Hereby being in horizon or in the world appears which is contrasted to the contemplation of being by Levinas. Thus, Levinas' attitudes approach to Ricoeur's, who the long hermeneutics way opposed to the short way of ontology. Conjointly, being in the horizon leads to Gadamer's hermeneutic horizon, where understanding unfolds as ‚I‘ and ‚You‘ meeting and recognition in the work of art. However, this openness (of work of art) and directedness (of participant of understanding) towards the Other is just an aspect of understanding in Ricoeur's and Gadamer's thinking. Meanwhile, relation with the Other becomes the care of Levinas' philosophy. To cognize means appealing to the Other, ethics becomes the contour of outness, and morality is no

more a branch of philosophy, it is primary in respect of philosophy. According to Levinas, the movement towards Other is no categorical and philosophy of Other is beyond the relation of Subject and Object. Identity is constituted as shock and responsibility of ‚I‘, which is evoked by something that is behind me. This becomes possible only then if you think not categorically. How is it possible to contemplate the Other if categorical thinking leads to the separation of a subject and an object, withdrawal into one’s narcissistic space and together to the destruction of identity, when ‚I‘ and ‚You‘ distances from each other?

Let’s remember Levinas’ metaphors. ‚Trace‘ is more common metaphor than ‚face‘ or ‚house‘: both ‚face‘ and ‚house‘ constitutes identity that directs to the Other. In this sense both of them are a trace, according to Levinas, the trace of the Other. ‚Trace of Other‘ is a metaphor not only formally. Trace just as metaphor, does not directly reveal the thing that is expressed and the relation. It does not have a direct reference, that its „indirectness itself” (Levinas). As we have seen, metaphor does not refer to something directly as well. Davidson denies the informative function of metaphor in general. Trace disturbs the order. That is how metaphor being absurd acts as a challenge and shock. According to Ricoeur, only alive metaphor acts like this. ‚Trace of Other‘ is the alive metaphor not only because it is new. Trace of Other means the continuous constitution of one’s identity towards the other that broadens the limits of ‚I‘ itself. Thus, a temporal aspect of trace of Other and of metaphor emerges. According to Levinas, trace is the interposition of space into time; it is the point where the world swings to the past and time. In this way trace as an ethical relation to the Other brings us to the ontological aspect of metaphor. However, it is not being in general, the Kantian abstraction of time and space. It is my house’s little space and a short moment with my beloved woman. Metaphor leads to „this time and this space”<sup>26</sup>. Thus it means „sensual nearness of an alive thing” (Šliogeris). Ricoeur ethical direction of alive metaphor leads to Šliogeris’ alive thing, opening „the transcendental distance”. And vice versa, poetic splendour or dead metaphor (abstraction) points „the corpses of things” and „pure relations” which mark our culture of death. That means totality as the war (Levinas), pure relation as nothingness (Šliogeris), symbolic exchange as hyper-reality (Baudrillard) that is aggressive towards the human (this one) being. It is closed in „the prison of ego”, having trampling the fragile ethical direction to the Other. The romantic genial conception gets on well with the idea of contemporary technological advance. However, solipsistic genius is inconsistent with the aspirations of alive and open metaphor and poetic identity. Metaphor does not have direct references; it shocks with its muteness. According to Šliogeris, „poetic word could be called a condensed

<sup>26</sup> A. Šliogeris, *Transcendencijos tyla*, Pradai, Vilnius 1996, p. 677.

silence of transcendence”<sup>27</sup>. In other words, by muteness (not announcing anything, presenting reference as absurdity) metaphor opens. How does it happen, and how openness nourishes the poetic identity?

Let's come back to Ricoeur's theory of metaphor. Ricoeur presents metaphor as tension and shock, raises its visual (iconic) and sensual (affective) dimensions, and emphasizes its interaction with the world, even if it does not refer to anything. Thus, primal reference is bracketed because of another reference – to the situational now and here. Hereby, poetic language opens the existential horizon of the world. *Ipsa facto*, it is an idyll with a new partner, openness to the reader. Thus, the human world opens or is recognized only with the regard to ethical direction to the Other. As the primary reference disappears because of the moment of recognition and meeting, so the identity of poet is constituted only having bracketed, overstepped, denied the direct reference to one's feelings. On the other hand, breaking the closed identity leads to the alive poetic identity, which is recognized by the reader, as his being here which is constituted in this way. In the same way the ontological aspect of metaphor is nourished by the ethical openness to the Other relation. Consequently, Levinas points the priority of ethics but not of ontology. This can be called ethical detour of ontology, which is led by the research of metaphor (one of the trop in poetic language). The ethical aspect of metaphor which emerges as the creativity of poetic identity: it continues to constitute its value of identity, even if the value appears as the world's and the human relations' recognition. Metaphor is a model of culture not because it is alive and creative like culture in general, but because it includes ethical openness to Other. The culture without openness – is a culture of death, even if it is very creative.

### Conclusion

So the theory of metaphor supplements philosophical poetics with openness and directedness that is creative because of constituting poetical identity. If metaphor as paradigm of philosophical poetics can be a model of a whole culture, philosophical poetics can be a model, as well. It is possible if philosophical poetics includes ethical creative directedness to Other.

### Abstract

The article deals with the relationship between metaphor and culture. On the one hand, metaphor is a phenomenon of culture and emerges in poetical language. On the other hand, metaphor could be treated as a model of culture. The author analyses

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 612.

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Ricoeur's theory of metaphor in the context of culture's criticism in general and of philosophical poetics in particular. The philosophical approach towards metaphor presupposes that philosophical poetics could be derived from Aristotle's poetical aspirations in his *Poetics*. Analysing the questions of contemporary culture the author refers to J. Baudrillard, T.S. Eliot and Lithuanian philosopher A. Šliogeris. The author stresses the ethical aspects of metaphor referring as well to E. Levinas. The article is a presentation of the author's monograph *Philosophical Poetics* published in Lithuanian (2006).

### Metafora i kultura (Streszczenie)

Podstawą treści artykułu jest związek pomiędzy metaforą i kulturą. Z jednej strony, metafora jest zjawiskiem kultury i pojawia się w języku poetyckim. Z drugiej strony, metafora mogłaby być traktowana jako model kultury. Autor analizuje teorię metafory Ricoeura w kontekście krytyki kultury w sensie ogólnym i poetyki filozoficznej w szczególności. Filozoficzne podejście do metafory zakłada, że poetyka filozoficzna mogłaby być zaczerpnięta z poetyckich aspiracji Arystotelesa zawartych w jego *Poetyce*. Analizując zagadnienia kultury współczesnej, autor odwołuje się do J. Baudrillarda, T.S. Eliota i litewskiego filozofa A. Šliogerisa. Autor podkreśla etyczne aspekty metafory, odwołując się również do E. Levinasa. Artykuł jest prezentacją monografii autora *Poetyka filozoficzna*, opublikowanej w języku litewskim (2006).